Abstract-In a recent paper, Jaggi et al. [10] , presented a distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-coding scheme that works in the presence of Byzantine faults. We revisit their adversarial models and augment them with three, arguably realistic, models. In each of the models, we present a distributed scheme that demonstrates the usefulness of the model. In particular, all of the schemes obtain optimal rate C −z, where C is the network capacity and z is a bound on the number of links controlled by the adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding is a powerful paradigm for network communication. In "traditional" networks, internal nodes simply transmit packets that arrive to them (without any substantial change of their content). In contrast, when performing network coding, internal nodes of the network are allowed to mix the information from different packets they receive before transmitting on outgoing edges. This mixing may substantially improve the throughput of a network, it can be done in a distributed manner with low complexity, and is robust to packet losses and network failures, e.g., [1] , [15] , [13] , [11] , [7] .
The focus of this paper is network coding for multicast networks (where a single sender wants to transmit the same information to several receivers), at the presence of Byzantine network faults. A Byzantine adversary that may maliciously introduce erroneous messages into a network may be especially disruptive when network coding is applied. The simple reason is that any message (including the faulty ones) affect all messages on its path to the recipient. Therefore, a single faulty message may contaminate many more messages down the line.
Motivated by the above difficulty, there has been some work on detecting and correcting Byzantine faults. We distinguish between computationally unbounded and computationally bounded adversaries. For computationally unbounded Byzantine adversaries, error detection was addressed in [8] . The work of Cai and Yeung [2] , [17] , [3] , generalizes standard bounds on error-correcting codes to networks, without providing any explicit algorithms for achieving these bounds. Jaggi et al. [9] , consider an information-theoretically rateoptimal solution to Byzantine attacks, which however requires a centralized design. Finally, a distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-coding scheme was recently obtained (independently) by Jaggi et al. [10] and Koetter and Kschischang [12] . Error detection for multicast network coding in the presence of computationally bounded Byzantine adversaries was also considered in the past [14] , [5] , [4] . In these works various authentication schemes are performed at internal nodes of the network. In [14] , [5] a centralized trusted authority is assumed to provide hashes of the original packets to each node in the network, [4] obviates the need for a trusted entity under the assumption that the majority of packets received at terminal nodes is uncorrupted.
This paper builds on the scheme of [10] to obtain distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-coding schemes in three realistic adversarial models (that have not been addressed in this setting previously). Our schemes, as well as those of [10] assume no knowledge of the topology of the network and follow the distributed network coding protocol of [7] . Namely, their implementation involves only a slight modification of the source and destination while the internal nodes can continue to use the standard protocol of [7] . Before we mention our contribution in detail, we present a brief description of two adversarial models studied in [10] . In the following informal summary, a sender named 'Alice' is interested in the transmission of information to a group of receivers named 'Bob' over a given network. The Byzantine adversary, 'Calvin', controls some of the links of the network and injects erroneous messages into the network in aim to corrupt the communication between Alice and Bob. Omniscient adversary model: In this model Calvin is allpowerful and all-knowing, and is limited only by the number of links z under his control. [10] present an efficient (i.e., polynomial time) distributed scheme A omn with optimal rate for this model of C − 2z, where C is the network capacity. Secret channel model: This model allows Alice to send to Bob a short (low rate) secret, which is completely hidden from Calvin -who is again all-powerful and all-knowing (excluding the secret), and is limited by the number of links z under his control. [10] present an efficient distributed scheme A sc , with optimal rate of C − z for this model. Notice that the rate achievable in this model is strictly higher than that in the Omniscient model. This secret channel model was originally referred to in [10] as the 'shared secret model'. We rename it here to secret channel model as the secret shared in this model between Alice and Bob may depend on Alice's message. We elaborate on this point in detail shortly.
Our Contribution
In this work we introduce three additional adversarial models, and give optimal rate efficient distributed network-coding schemes in each of the models. As mentioned above, our schemes (as well as those of [10] ) assume no knowledge of the topology of the network and follow the distributed network coding protocol of [7] . Roughly speaking, we obtain an optimal rate of C−z on all the adversarial models described below (the optimality of our schemes follow, e.g., from [9] ). Random-Secret Model: The first model we preset is the random secret model in which Alice and Bob share a short random secret which is completely hidden from Calvin. Calvin is all-powerful and all-knowing (excluding the secret), and is limited by the number of links z under his control. This model differs from the 'secret channel' model discussed in [10] in the sense that the secret that is shared by Alice and Bob is not constructed as a function of Alice's message, but rather is uniformly distributed and independent of Alice's message. The independence of the secret shared by Alice and Bob from the actual message M being transmitted by Alice has several advantages. This allows Alice and Bob to share their secret prior to the act of communicating M . For example, one may consider the scenario where Alice and Bob are able to meet (or communicate) in advance and share a large source of completely random bits (such as a CD of uniformly generated bits). As long as these bits are unknown to Calvin, they can be used overtime to communicate at high rate over the network (without the need of an additional low rate channel connecting Alice and Bob). Moreover, as we will see shortly, communication in this model sets the foundations for communicating at high rate in the setting in which Calvin is computationally bounded (more specifically, in the symmetric key cryptographic setting). We would like to note that in the scheme of [10] for their 'secret channel' model, the secret information that Alice and Bob share indeed strongly depends on the message M Alice transmits to Bob and hence cannot extend naturally to the examples mentioned above.
For the random secret model we obtain a network coding scheme with optimal rate of C − z. Our scheme is obtained by a transformation of the scheme of [10] for the secret channel model. In our proof we do not need to get into the finer details of the original scheme and instead observe and exploit a useful property of the original secret composition. Causal-Omniscient Model: As in the Omniscient model of [10] , in this model we assume Calvin is all-powerful and allknowing, and is again limited by the number of links z under his control. However, to obtain rate greater than C − 2z, we slightly restrict Calvin. Namely, we assume that Calvin is causal. Specifically, when Calvin injects messages into the network at time step t, he only has access to messages sent by Alice at time steps at most t + Δ. Here, Δ is some parameter of the network which is considered small compared with the length of the communication stream.
We present an optimal rate distributed network coding scheme for this model. Just as in the omniscient adversary model, our scheme requires C > 2z. However, in such a case we obtain a rate of C − z (compared with C − 2z in the omniscient adversary model). Our scheme is obtained by a fully modular composition of two network coding schemes from [10] : one for the omniscient adversary model and the other for the secret channel model. The study of the causalomniscient model will set the foundations for communicating at high rate in yet an additional setting in which Calvin is computationally bounded, the public key cryptographic setting.
We would like to note that causal adversaries were also studied in [9] in the centralized setting, while in this work we focus on the distributed setting. Nevertheless, the upper bounds proven in [9] imply that the requirement of C > 2z is necessary (otherwise no information can be transmitted).
Computationally-Bounded Adversary Model: While our previous models did not make any computational assumptions on the parties involved, we now turn to study the case in which Calvin is computationally bounded (as before Calvin is all-knowing, excluding any secret keys, and limited by the number of links z under his control). In this setting, we present two results. The first result uses the notion of symmetric key cryptography and is based on our random secret model. Roughly speaking, in the case Calvin is computationally bounded, one may replace the random secret in the random secret model, by a series of pseudo-random bits: bits that would still look completely random (i.e., uniform) to Calvin. Now, to generate an (effectively) unlimited amount of shared pseudo-random bits, to be used in several executions of the random secret protocol, all Alice and Bob need to do is exchange a single short secret key prior to the communication process. This single key, and the bits it generates may be used over essentially unlimited time to communicate at high rate.
The second result addresses the public key cryptographic setting. In this setting, each of the parties, Alice and Bob, hold a pair of keys: a private key (known only to itself) and a public key (known to all -including Calvin). Encrypted point to point communication between Alice and Bob can be done using these public and private keys; without Alice and Bob ever meeting in advance to exchange a shared secret key. However, in the model we study, no point to point channel is available -and Alice would like to communicate at high rate to Bob over a given network. We present a network coding scheme for the model at hand. Our scheme is based on the scheme we present for the causal-omniscience model, with the sole difference that public-key encryption is used to hide some of Alice's information from Calvin.
As common in the study of cryptographic primitives, both our results are conditional -in the sense that they hold assuming that certain cryptographic primitives exist (such as the assumption that factoring is hard). Under such assumptions, we prove in the symmetric key setting that our scheme obtains an optimal rate of C − z, and in the (weaker) public key setting we obtain the same optimal rate under the condition that C > 2z. In this model Calvin is no longer causal, however, as in the causal-omniscient model, it can be seen that the upper bounds of [9] imply that the latter requirement of C > 2z is necessary.
We note that in the public key scenario, we assume that Alice knows Bob's public key. For this reason, the publickey model seems particularly suitable in settings where cryptography is already involved (e.g., to ensure privacy and integrity of the communication). In such a scenario, a publickey infrastructure may already be available and computational limitations on the adversary are usually already assumed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains the model definitions and notation. Sections III, IV and V discuss the three new models and schemes presented above. Due to space limitation, several of our claims appear without proof. Specifically, the results of Sections IV and V are stated without proof. A full version of the paper can be found in [16] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
We now briefly present our definitions and notation. We mostly follow [10] , and refer the reader to [10] for further details. The network will be modelled as a graph. We assume our graphs are acyclic, and the communication over them is done in a synchronous manner. Namely, in each time step a single packet of information can traverse an edge of the network. We will consider the task of routing information over the network from a single sender Alice to multiple receivers Bob (the setting of multicast). In fact, in our analysis, it will be sufficient to consider a single receiver Bob. This state of affairs is common in the study of multicast network coding, e.g. [10] , and (although not completely obvious) applies to all our protocols.
We will not assume that Alice, Bob or any other internal node is aware of the network topology or of the location of Alice and Bob in the network. The network topology will only influence the maximal achievable rate. A network-coding scheme is defined by Alice's encoder, Bob's decoder, and the coding performed in internal nodes. We will now discuss these three components.
Let M be the message Alice wishes to transmit to Bob. The encoding algorithm of Alice adds some redundancy into the message, thus obtaining an encoded message X. It is convenient to assume that X is represented by a b × n matrix, where every entry of the matrix is an element from a finite field F q . We refer to a column as a slice, to a row as a packet, and to each entry as a symbol. It is also useful to note that in all of the schemes of [10] , as well as ours, X is composed of the original message M , and in addition some δn slices of redundancy. In other words, the size of M is (1 − δ) that of X.
The specific coding performed by internal nodes is less relevant to our work, as it is inherited without change from [10] . For concreteness, let us mention that internal nodes, as well as Alice herself, perform random linear network coding a la [7] (on the slices of X). Also, as common in the literature of network coding, as our graphs are acyclic, we assume that information from different slices is not mixed throughout the communication process. This can be established by sufficient memory at internal nodes of the network.
Calvin has under its control z network links of its choice. On these links Calvin may inject his own packets, disguised as part of the information flow from Alice to Bob. Calvin succeeds if Bob decodes a message different than Alice's original M . The goal of the network-coding scheme is to ensure this only happens with very small probability while maximizing the rate in which information flows from Alice to Bob.
We do not assume that Alice, Bob or any internal node are aware of the links under Calvin's control. On the other hand, Calvin has full knowledge of the network topology as well as the identity of Alice and Bob. In all of our models we assume that Calvin has full eavesdropping capabilities (i.e., Calvin can monitor the entire communication on each one of the links). Calvin knows the encoding and decoding schemes of Alice and Bob, and the network code implemented by the internal nodes (including the random linear coefficients).
The network capacity, denoted by C, is the maximum number of symbols that can be delivered on average, per time step, from Alice to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference (i.e., the 'min-cut' capacity). For a message M , the error probability e(M ) is the probability that Bob reconstructs a message different from Alice's message M . The (maximum) error probability of the encoding scheme is defined to be e = max M {e(M )} (here the maximization is taken over the message M of Alice). The rate is the number of information symbols that can be delivered on average, per time step, from Alice to Bob . In the parameters above, the rate equals (1−δ)·b (recall that δ is the fraction of redundant slices). Rate R is said to be achievable if for any α > 0 and > 0 there exists a coding scheme of block length n with rate ≥ R − α and error probability e ≤ . Throughout, a network coding scheme is said to be efficient if it is polynomial in the block length n and the size of the underlying graph.
A. Proof techniques: reduction and worst case analysis
In this work, the correctness of our coding schemes will be proven by means of reduction. More specifically, our proofs can be outlined as follows. We first define our coding schemes. We will then assume for sake of contradiction that they are not secure. As we would like our schemes to be secure for any message M of Alice, this will imply the existence of an adversary Calvin that first chooses which message M Alice should send to Bob, and then is able to corrupt the communication of M between Alice and Bob. Thinking of Calvin as an algorithmic procedure, we show how to define an additional adversary Calvin' -which is a procedure based on Calvin. Finally we show that Calvin' is able to break one of the (provably secure) schemes presented in [10] -this suffices to conclude our proof.
III. RANDOM-SECRET MODEL
The random-secret model is similar to the secret-channel model of [10] with the difference that the secret information sent from Alice to Bob should be random and independent of Alice's input message M . Formally, we allow Alice to share with Bob a short secret (which is uniformly distributed). This secret will stay hidden from Calvin. a) Alice's secret and message encoding in A sc : Recall that A sc is the scheme presented in [10] for communication in the secret-channel model. We will show how to transform A sc to a comparable scheme which works in the random secret model. The only ingredients of A sc we need to recall is the structure of Alice's secret and of Alice's encoder. The encoding of M into X is very simple: We assume that Alice's message M is a b × (n − b) matrix over F q . The matrix X is M concatenated with the b × b identity matrix, I. Namely,
Alice's secret message is computed in two steps. She first chooses C parity symbols uniformly at random from the field F q . The parity symbols are labelled r d , for d ∈ {1, . . . , C}. We denote by R the vector of parity symbols. Corresponding to the parity symbols, Alice's parity-check matrix P is defined as the n × C matrix whose (i, j) th entry equals (r j ) i , i.e., r j taken to the i th power. The second part of Alice's secret message is the b × C hash matrix H, computed as the matrix product X · P . The secret message sent by Alice to Bob on the secret channel is composed of both R and H. As b ≤ C, the secret is of size C 2 + C symbols. b) A useful property of A sc : Note that the vector R of Alice's secret is already uniform and independent of the message M . On the other hand, the hash H is a deterministic function of R and M (given by the equation H = X · P ). Our main observation (which we will prove below) is the following: for almost every value of R, when M is uniform then H is uniform as well. Furthermore, it is enough that a small chunk of M will be uniform to guarantee the uniformity of H. This suggests the following idea: instead of selecting H as a function of Alice's message, we can select both R and H uniformly at random. Later, Alice can tweak the message a bit such that we indeed get H = X · P . We continue to formalizing this idea.
A. Defining the new scheme A rs
We now show how to transform A sc into a scheme A rs with comparable performance in the random secret model. To define the scheme we now define the random secret, Alice's encoder, Bob's decoding, and the coding in internal nodes.
c) The random secret: The secret shared between Alice and Bob is composed of a length-C vector R over F q and a b × C matrix H over F q . Both are selected uniformly at random (and independently of each other). Even though R and H are selected uniformly, their function in A rs is identical to the function of R and H in A sc . We therefore use the same notation as given above. In particular, we refer to H as the hash matrix. The elements of R are referred to as the parity symbols and denoted r d , for d ∈ {1, . . . , C}. Furthermore, we define the corresponding parity-check matrix P as before.
d) Alice's encoder: We allow Alice to encode a slightly shorter input message M assumed to be a b×(n−b−C) matrix over
where L is a b × C matrix and I is the b × b identity matrix. The matrix L is defined such that H = X ·P . We show shortly that this system of linear equations (on the elements of L) will have a unique solution with high probability over H and P . If this system has no solution, or more than a single one, we define L to be the all-zero matrix.
e) Network coding and Bob's decoder: Both the network coding and Bob's decoder are defined in the same way as in A sc [10] . Once Bob decodes a matrix [LM ], Bob discards of the b × C prefixL and outputsM . Theorem 3.1: A rs is an efficient distributed scheme. A rs achieves a rate of C − z, in the random-secret model. The random secret consists of C 2 + C symbols. Proof: We will prove that the probability that Bob decodes correctly in A rs is almost identical to the probability that Bob decodes correctly in A sc . The theorem will then follow immediately from the definition of A rs and the properties of A sc . We note that even though Alice is able to send to Bob a little bit less information in A rs than in A sc (specifically, Alice sends b · C fewer elements of F q ), the rate in both schemes is identical (as we consider the rate as n goes to infinity).
Let us consider an adversary Calvin that makes A rs fail with probability . In particular, Calvin may chose a message M for Alice to send s.t. with probability , Bob reconstructs M which is different than M . We will define an adversary Calvin' that makes A sc fail with probability ≥ − C 2 /q. This will conclude our proof.
Calvin' is defined as follows. First Calvin' imitates the message selection of Calvin. If Calvin sets Alice's input to the message M then Calvin' sets Alice'
where L is a uniformly chosen b × C matrix. Then Calvin' continues to mimic Calvin, and behaves identically (in particular Calvin' sends the same messages as Calvin would on the same corrupted links).
As we see, Calvin' tries to fail A sc by mimicking an attack of Calvin on the execution of A rs . The success of Calvin's attack on the execution of A rs depends both on the message X = [L M I] transmitted by Alice and the secret information R, H shared by Alice and Bob. Let D be the distribution over triplets (R, H, L) obtained when R and H are selected uniformly at random (and independently of each other) and the matrix L is defined to satisfy H = X · P if a single such L exists, and is defined to be the all-zero matrix otherwise. Let A be the set of triplets (R, H, L) on which Calvin's attack succeeds (here we are assuming Calvin to be a deterministic adversary, however our analysis extends naturally to the case in which Calvin may act based on random decisions also). Namely, the success probability of Calvin can be formalized as Pr D [A] (here the probability is over the distribution D). In what follows we show that D and D are almost identical. This will suffice to prove our assertion.
Definition 3.2:
The event E bad on R happens either if one of the parity symbols is selected to be zero or if any two of the parity symbols are identical. In other words, E bad happens if there exists d ∈ {1, . . . , C} such that r d = 0, or if for two distinct d, d ∈ {1, . . . , C}, we have that r d = r d .
Note that E bad is defined both for D and for D . In both cases, R is uniformly distributed. Therefore
Furthermore, it holds that this probability is at most C 2 /q. We are now able to formalize our main observation.
Lemma 3.3:
Conditioned on E bad not happening, the two distributions D and D are identical.
Proof: (of lemma) Let us fix any value of M . Let us also fix any value of R such that E bad does not happen. We will show that conditioned on every such fixings, the distributions D and D are identical.
Let us decompose the n × C parity-check matrix P into a C × C matrix V and an (n − C) × C matrix P , such that
. By the definition of P , the matrix V is the Van der Monde matrix that corresponds to the parity symbols in R. Since we assumed that E bad does not happen, we have that the parity symbols are all distinct and non zero. Therefore V is invertible.
With this notation, we can rewrite the equation H = X · P as follows:
Since we already fixed M and R, we have that [M I] · P is a fixed matrix, which we will denote as H . We also have that V is a fixed invertible matrix. We denote by V −1 its inverse. Now we have that H = L · V + H , or alternatively that L = (H − H ) · V −1 . We can conclude that for every value of H there is exactly one value of L for which H = X · P . We therefore have that the equation H = X ·P forces a one-to-one correspondence between the values of L and the values of H. Therefore, the uniform distribution over L induces the uniform distribution over H and vise versa. The lemma follows.
Recall that we defined A be the set of triplets (R, H, L) on which Calvin's attack succeeds. It follows from the lemma that conditioned on E bad not happening, Pr[A] is identical under D and D . Since we already argued that Pr
2 /q, we can conclude that the probability that E bad does not happen and A does happen is at least − C 2 /q (regardless of whether the probability is taken over D or D ). We can finally conclude that Calvin' succeeds in failing A sc with probability at least − C 2 /q.
IV. CAUSAL-OMNISCIENT MODEL
We now define the scheme A co for the Causal-Omniscient model, in which when Calvin injects messages into the network at time step t, he only has access to messages sent by Alice at time steps at most t + Δ. Here, Δ is some parameter of the network which is considered small compared with the length of the communication stream. The scheme is obtained by a completely modular composition of two schemes (discussed in the Introduction): the scheme A sc in the secretchannel model, and the scheme A omn in the omniscientadversary model. The idea of the composition is straightforward: first Alice, Bob (and the network) execute A sc with Alice's input M , but without Alice sending the message on the secret channel (simply because a secret channel is not available in this model). Unfortunately, without the secret message, Bob cannot decode M correctly. Therefore, to transmit this secret information, we suggest that Alice and Bob execute A omn with the secret message as Alice's new input (this will imply the constraint C > 2z). Unfortunately, A omn may reveal the secret message to Calvin as well. Our observation is that as long as the secret message is revealed after the execution of A sc ends, it is too late for Calvin to cause any harm. Therefore, all that we need (so that A co works) is for Alice to send Δ "garbage" columns between the executions of A sc and of A omn . Theorem 4.1: A co is an efficient distributed scheme. A co achieves a rate of C − z, as long as C > 2z, in the CausalOmniscient model.
V. COMPUTATIONALLY-BOUNDED ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section we consider a limitation of a different flavor on the strength of the adversary Calvin. Namely, we assume that Calvin is computationally bounded. Assuming so allows us to employ powerful cryptographic tools. The two results in this section correspond to cryptographic tools that are applicable in two different settings: (1) Symmetric-key cryptography, and (2) Public-key cryptography. As common in the study of cryptographic primitives, both our results are conditional -in the sense that they hold assuming that certain cryptographic primitives exist (such as the assumption that factoring is hard). Symmetric-key cryptography: assuming that Alice and Bob share a single short secret key, using a pseudorandom generator [6] they may generate several pseudo random bits to be used in multiple executions of the A rs scheme. The resulting scheme A sk satisfies:
Theorem 5.1: A sk is an efficient distributed scheme. A sk achieves a rate of C − z, in the symmetric-key model. Public-key cryptography: assuming the existence of a publickey infrastructure, applying scheme A co on Alice's message M and on the encryption of the additional secret information, will result in the scheme A pk that will enable communication at high rate without Alice and Bob ever meeting.
Theorem 5.2:
A pk is an efficient distributed scheme. A pk achieves a rate of C − z, as long as C > 2z, in the public-key model.
